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ARTICLE / ARTÍCULO
ABSTRACT The article analyzes organizational, managerial, and institutional
challenges in the development of systemic governance for the implementation of
policies with a human rights approach, taking as a case study the Chilean health
reform initiated with that approach in 2004. The study integrates a qualitative analysis
of legal norms, of managerial instruments and of 40 interviews conducted in 2009
with health executives in three regions of Chile. The findings show that in this reform
there is a close connection between incentives and calculations of personal benefit
that does not favor agency interdependence. The prevalence of this trait tends to
undermine the values of mutual aid and cooperation needed to achieve the integral
solutions to social problems that a human rights approach demands. The conclusions
reached state, in part, that an uncritical acceptance of management and organization
methods inherited from previous institutional reforms often creates contradictions in
the development of a governance structure conducive to a human rights approach.
KEY WORDS Health Care Reform; Human Rights; Management/organization &
administration; Public Policies, Chile.
RESUMEN El artículo analiza los nudos y desafíos organizacionales, de gestión e
institucionales de la construcción de gobernanza sistémica en la implantación de
políticas con enfoque de derechos. Adopta como caso la reforma sanitaria chilena
iniciada bajo ese enfoque en el año 2004. La metodología integró un análisis cualitativo
de normas legales, de instrumentos de gestión y de 40 entrevistas en profundidad
efectuadas en 2009 a directivos de salud de distintos establecimientos en tres regiones de
Chile. Los hallazgos muestran que en la reforma prevalece una conexión entre
incentivos, cálculos privados de beneficios personales y mediciones que no favorece la
gestión de las interdependencias y tiende a debilitar los valores de ayuda y cooperación
mutua necesarios para alcanzar la integralidad en la solución de las problemáticas que
los derechos interpelan. Se concluye, entre otros aspectos, que una aceptación acrítica
de los modos de gestión y organización heredados de reformas institucionales previas,
genera contradicciones con la necesidad de construir gobernanza para un enfoque de
derechos. 
PALABRAS CLAVE Reforma Sanitaria; Derechos Humanos; Gerencia/gestión
administrativa; Políticas Públicas; Chile. 
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INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the health care models
developed in the majority of European countries,
most Latin American health systems were initially
aimed at specific social strata in the population,
leading to social segmentation and consequently to
stratification in the exercise of health as a right (1).
In this context, the institutional reforms that have
taken place in the public sector over the past 30
years, particularly in Chile, have tended to
reinforce the fragmentation of the health system by
separating the insurance, funding and provision of
health care services, by increasing participation of
the private sector in the provision of services and
by a decentralization process that shifts the
responsibility for primary care to the municipalities.
These measures have been governed by the
rationale that the main institutional incentive to be
adopted by the public sector is the development of
results-oriented competition to obtain funding.
At the same time, during the last
decade, the Public Policies with a Human Rights
Approach (PPED, from the Spanish Políticas
Públicas con Enfoque de Derechos) (2-6), have
gained renewed relevance. PPEDs emphasize the
notions of universality, non-discrimination and
enforceability of social rights but also the
importance of a holistic or integral approach to
ensure the enjoyment of a right, which makes it
crucial to consider the attributes that create
governance in the institutions in charge of the
implementation of a PPED.
The Chilean health care reform, which
started in 2004 (a), included as a key feature the
progressive guaranteeing of enforceable health
rights — Explicit Health Guarantees, (GES, from the
Spanish Garantías Explícitas de Salud) — for both
the public and private social security system,
comprising coverage rights, the application of
maximum wait times for receiving care, financial
protection, and a quality standard for the treatment
of a number of severe, expensive and frequently-
occurring health problems — 66 to date — which
account for a large portion of the burden of disease.
At the same time, in the public system, the reform
sought to adapt the primary care model to a family
health model. Moreover, the institutional
restructuring caused by the legal framework of the
reform withdrew the functions of the Sanitary
Authority from the twenty-nine health care services
— which from that moment on deal exclusively
with the management of the health care network to
provide health services within their jurisdiction —
and vested those powers in fifteen Regional
Ministerial Health Secretariats (Seremis, from the
Spanish Secretarías Regionales Ministeriales de
Salud). At the ministerial level, this separation of
duties was evidenced by the creation of two
undersecretariats (or viceministries), the
Undersecretariat for Health Care Networks and
the Undersecretariat for Public Health. Figures 1
and 2 show the structure of the health care sector
before and after the reform. These figures illustrate
both the emergence of new actors and the
increasing complexity of relations. 
The argument herein developed is that
the implementation of the Chilean health care
reform, despite being grounded in a human rights
approach, has adopted organizational and
management schemes that respond to the
hegemonic pattern of institutional changes, and,
therefore, are not necessarily consistent with the
demands of governance imposed by the legal
framework of the PPED. Therefore, the aim of this
article is to provide an analysis of the
implementation problems that complements
traditional perspectives. Such perspectives
usually only focus on financial issues (7,8) or on
the analysis of the political economy of the
changes (9,10) (conflicting interests, resistance
strategies of the actors that may stand to lose,
consistency of the government coalition, etc.) or
on technical deficits, but do not emphasize the
fact that organizational and management
schemes are not politically harmless, as they
contribute to the establishment of ground rules
which have an impact on balances of power and
values and, therefore, on the development of
governance.
THE CONCEPTUAL BASE: SYSTEMIC
GOVERNANCE FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACH TO HEALTH
As has been previously noted (11), the
concept of governance sheds light on the limits of
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governing through one single actor and
emphasizes that the quality of the interactions
created by a particular institutional scheme is as
important as the efficiency. In the implementation
of policies with a human rights approach, the
focus on finding integral solutions specifically
involves different public actors concerned with
health issues, making governance a necessary
feature that can complement such concepts as
Integrated Health Service Networks (RISS, from
the Spanish Redes Integradas de Servicios de
Salud) (1). The situation is different in the private
sector, which although involved in the
implementation of a human rights approach,
operates in the buying and selling of services both
internally (buying) and with the public sector
(basically selling) (b).
The concept of systemic governance
(11,13), in contrast to the use other authors have
given it (14), refers to the alignment and
integration of public actors for the effective
protection of an established right. According to
this perspective, systemic governance exists when
at minimum the government actors involved in
the exercise of a civil right maintain authentic and
sustained relationships of cooperation in order to
generate integral solutions to the problems
addressed by this right.
Based on the different contributions
provided by the specialized literature on this
subject, it is assumed that at least three
dimensions must be addressed in order to ensure
that systemic governance becomes a feature of
public administration: the instrumental, the
spatial and the value-related dimensions.
According to the literature, relations are
built (or hindered) through these three
dimensions, which simultaneously interact with
and shape one another. These dimensions, then,
implicitly define a strategy of governance,
providing a group with directionality and
consistency with regard to certain purposes. 
The spatial dimension considers that
cooperation is more effective when based on
trust rather than on authority and stresses the
importance of developing spaces of mutual
communication among the different actors
involved in the implementation of the PPED, so
as to trigger processes of shared meaning and
knowledge production (15,16), as well as to
increase awareness of their interdependency.
This dimension is also grounded in extensive
literature highlighting the need for developing
deliberative processes to increase mutual
understanding and to help cope with different
interests and perspectives, which are particularly
significant in the public sector (17-20). It is also
based in research conducted on intersectoral
management, which suggests that such spaces
are especially important in the implementation of
public policies regarding multidimensional social
problems that demand not only appropriate
coordination among several government sectors
but also the existence of shared views and the
articulation of resources and knowledge among
the sectors (21,22).
The instrumental dimension refers to
the potentiality of planning, budget-making and
evaluative instruments to promote the necessary
articulations among actors, so as to make the
established right feasible. The idea here is that
spaces of mutual communication alone will not
lead to integration if the managerial instruments
are not themselves integrative. The best example
of this is the ineffectiveness, in general, of spaces
of interinstitutional coordination which operate
on the basis of unilateral planning and budget-
making processes. The importance of these
elements has been indirectly underscored by the
literature specialized in network and relational
administration (23-25), as well as by more recent
literature concerning health (1,26).
The value-related dimension underlies
the other two previously mentioned dimensions.
In particular it stresses the consistency between
result-oriented goals established by the
managerial instruments and the value of mutual
cooperation, in view of the interdependency
existent between values and institutions (27-29).
In light of these dimensions, it is
suggested that the existence of systemic
governance requires the development of
institutional incentives to manage the change
towards comprehensive and deliberative
management within the relevant government
sector and with the other sectors involved in the
results of a PPED (including, of course, the
financial sectors). This idea is particularly
pertinent to the health care sector, given the
fragmentation of the system.
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The practical expressions of systemic
governance are, at minimum, the following: a)
institutionalized spaces of mutual communication
(deliberation) among actors, in order to ensure
integrity; b) instruments and processes of
networked management which aim at a
comprehensive handling of the PPED both within
and among sectors; and c) value criteria consistent
with networked budget-making, programming
and evaluation processes and, in general, with the
development of governance. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Using the abovementioned conceptual
framework, this investigation adopted as its unit
of analysis the relations promoted within the
Chilean public health system to implement the
health care reform. This qualitative study
involved a documentary analysis of primary and
secondary sources in order to identify, first of all,
the managerial instruments (planning, budget-
making, coordination and evaluation) which hold
the different actors in the health sector
responsible for the achievement of results-
oriented goals in the implementation of health
policies. These instruments were classified
according to the following three criteria:
1) The nature of the instrument, according to the
directionality of the action in health: health care
provision or promotion and prevention;
2) The origin of the instrument: external or internal
to the health sector;
3) The scope of the instrument: external transversal
instruments covering the entire public sector,
internal transversal instruments related to the
health sector as a whole, or specific instruments
dealing with the operation of a certain field.
Figure 1. Network of relationships in the health sector before the Chilean health care reform
in 2004.
Source: own elaboration.
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Secondly, the study sought to identify
and characterize the aspects of coordination
included in the design of the legal and regulatory
frameworks.
The documentary analysis was
complemented by 40 in-depth interviews with
health care executives held between November
and December 2009, with the purpose of
assessing the existence of systemic governance in
the institutions in charge of the implementation
of human rights policies, and to determine the
critical organizational and institutional factors
Source: own elaboration.
Figure 2. Network of relationships and functions in the health sector after the Chilean health care
reform in 2004.
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involved in the development of governance. Both
top-level executives (Undersecretary for Health
Care Networks and Health Superintendent) and
local health network executives and their
institutions were included. To this effect a three-
stage sample was developed. The first stage
included the selection of three regions in the
country, two predominantly urban and the other
markedly rural, for their high population density.
Two Health Services (SS, from the Spanish
Servicios de Salud) were randomly selected
within each region, as they represent the key
node of the health care networks within the
different areas. Within the jurisdiction of each SS,
the executives of the health care networks joined
by the SS were interviewed. Specifically, those
interviewed were: the executives of a high-
complexity hospital and a medium-complexity
hospital; the executives of two Health
Corporations or Municipal Health Departments
corresponding to a municipality with high urban
concentration and another defined as vulnerable
by the Ministry of Health; and within them, at
random, the executives of a Family Health Center
(CESFAM, from the Spanish Centro de Salud
Familiar), an ambulatory primary care center
which operates under a family health care model.
All the executives interviewed gave their
informed consent, previously validated by an
Ethics Committee, both for the interview and the
study. The information gathered from the
interviews was structured into dimensions,
processed using the program AtlasT1 and
compared to the findings from the documentary
analysis. It should also be mentioned that the
information presented here is solely a part of the
more extensive results obtained (13).
RESULTS
Communication channels and their effects
on governance
A review of the legal norms and
regulations regarding the formal connections
among actors generated by the reform shows a
clear intention to incorporate consultation
mechanisms through diversely composed
councils, committees and other similar bodies.
However, the only entity specifically created to
coordinate the operation of the public system has
been a Council for the Integration of the Health
Care Network (CIRA, from the Spanish Consejo de
Integración de la Red Asistencial), an advisory
body organized by the relevant health care service.
Every health service director interviewed
acknowledges the usefulness of the CIRA as a
channel of articulation in the health care network,
except for an interviewee that expressed that its
prestige has been gradually lost. In contrast, the
opinion of the hospital directors is mostly negative,
either because of the tendency to "plan according
the services available" or because it is a "symbolic"
channel. The municipal health directors refer to the
CIRA as the only health care communication
channel in which they have formally participated
since the reform, but only in the municipalities
where the SS has innovated by granting decision-
making powers to the CIRA, do the executives
acknowledge its usefulness. For executives of the
CESFAM, what is valued is the possibility of
increasing the decision-making capacity of these
centers. Inasmuch as the CIRA does not fulfill this
function, its efficacy is called into question.
It is surprising to discover that the reform
did not create cross-sector communication
channels which could connect the different
government sectors concerned with health care
provision. In fact, the only cross-sector articulation
channels at the local level — the Life Committees
Chile (Comités Vida Chile) — date back to the
1990s. These Committees seek to connect
different sectors, but they are not mentioned by
health service directors (managers of the health
care network). The only mention made of them is
that, because each Committee applies
independently for projects, the resulting mix of
different unconnected projects further reduces
their impact. The hospital directors make
practically no mention of cross-sector
communication channels. However, this is not the
case with municipal health directors (primary
care), who highlight the influence of cross-sector
communication channels in their activities.
With regard to the tactics of
interinstitutional relations with other relevant
actors, the stress is placed on the use of the
territories defined by the corresponding regional
government so as to facilitate a more focused
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outreach at the territorial level. The directors of
high complexity hospitals highlight the use of
lobbying to leverage initiatives. Directors of
community hospitals (low complexity hospitals)
and of CESFAM emphasize connections forged
with carabineros (policemen), firefighters, the
judicial branch and the municipality in order to
expand the reach of public health goals; these
connections demonstrate the creation of
networks that are highly instrumental, with the
objective of obtaining the economic benefits
related to such goals. 
In conclusion, the spatial dimension of
systemic governance, expressed in mutual spaces
of communication among the public actors
involved in the implementation of the PPEDs,
does not seem to be explicitly acknowledged by
the institutional authorities in charge of
implementing health care PPEDs. Only certain
actors, who have chosen to make a more political
use of these channels by including deliberative
processes and civic participation, recognize that
they have been able to generate processes of
shared meaning and knowledge production and
increase the awareness of their interdependency.
Let us now examine the results regarding the
instrumental dimension of governance.
Managerial instruments in the Chilean
health care sector, their values and impact
in systemic governance
The first findings of the documentary
analysis show the great variety in the origins and
nature of managerial instruments that affect the
types of relationships existing in the health
sector, beyond those that have been formally
predetermined.
There is a predominance of external
transversal instruments, especially of performance
indicators and Management Improvement
Programs (PMG, from the Spanish Programas de
Mejoramiento de la Gestión) (c). These instruments
were created by the Ministry of Finance and
implemented throughout the Chilean public sector
nearly two decades ago as part of a results-oriented
management logic related to the institutional
reforms emphasizing the relationship between
economic incentives, calculations of personal
benefit and performance measurements. These
instruments involve all public health care
institutions, but are basically negotiated at the
central level. Generally, they contain a monetary
incentive to foment their fulfillment, which the
involved services do not always access, as in the
case of some PMG. They also do not contain
performance evaluation criteria regarding the
processes of management of change towards an
integrated system for the implementation of the
PPEDs. In addition to the already mentioned
instruments, there are others of a more political
nature that establish commitments to the major
government priorities and to the creation of
opportunities for civil participation that must
operate in the entire Chilean public sector.
Other relevant elements are the internal
transversal instruments of management in the
health sector referring to public health goals and
the GES; the latter are defined by the legislation.
Within the different regions there are no
formal instruments of articulation between the
Health Authority represented by the Seremis and
the health care services, which suggests that the
new institutional design neither facilitates the
connection between public health functions and
the planning of the provision of health care
services, nor contemplates any instruments for the
adaptation of the GES and the health goals in the
region. On the other hand, the existing
relationships prioritize the supervision and control
of the fulfillment of general public health goals
rather than the expression of goals and health
achievements relevant to the regional level.
Regarding the managerial instruments
of health care networks, the normative
frameworks underlying the reform update and
consolidate the functions of health care services
and emphasize the idea of "health care network
management" over that of "health care service
direction," which includes the appointment of an
director (now called "network manager") who
signs an agreement of "High-level public
direction" with the Civil Service Bureau
(Dirección de Servicio Civil, which is part of the
Ministry of Finance) after gaining his or her
appointment through a competitive public
application process; however, these agreements
have been criticized because even though they
encourage executives to focus on achieving
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results during their administration, they make use
of the PMG indicators and, therefore, do not
permit a focus on the results of the actual work of
administration.
However, progress is being made in the
decentralization process by reaffirming the
autonomy of health services and granting them
powers to make agreements with different local
health care providers. 
The management agreements between
health care services and municipalities seek to
restore coordination in health care goals,
including the GES. The counterpart to this
phenomenon is that there are virtually no formal
agreements between health care services and
hospitals; even though the portfolio of services
provided by a hospital must be approved by the
director of the relevant health care service, no
production goals for each kind of service are
formally established in each hospital. This
delicate situation is further threatened by the
emergence of networked self-managed hospitals,
which are granted administrative powers
previously conferred to health care services.
Regarding the managerial instruments
concerning public health, other than
environmental inspection instruments or specific
programs, the Seremis have no managerial
instruments with which to institute their policies
in the regional system (prevention, promotion,
regulations). In fact, adherence to public health
policies is basically promoted by means of
management agreements and results-oriented
incentives generated by the health care network,
which are not part of the kind of actions, areas of
responsibility and resources involved in public
health management. This inhibits, particularly at
primary health care level, a change in focus from
individual to collective health actions.
Similarly, the perceptions of different
types of actors regarding the efficacy of the
instruments involved in the development of
systemic governance tend to confirm the
conclusions derived from this analysis of
managerial instruments and provide new
evidence; in the following paragraphs these
perceptions will be explained. 
The directors of health services mention
that the great diversity of goals to be achieved by
these services, either directly or indirectly,
hinders their performance as managers of the
health network and their ability to focus on issues
relevant to their territories.
The directors of high complexity
hospitals reflect constantly upon the issue of
management and its restrictions, as well as on
resources difficulties. There is an evident lack of
understanding of the criteria and mechanisms
for transferring resources used by the National
Health Fund (public insurer), to the point that
such mechanisms are seen as arbitrary, unfair
and discouraging of good hospital management.
At the same time, these actors point out that the
Ministry of Health frequently demands new
requirements of different types, outside the
scope of and often inconsistent with established
performance agreements. Some directors
describe an atmosphere of imposition rather
than of negotiation in the sector. They also state
that the budget formulation process at the
hospital level is unclear, and there are questions
surrounding budget implementation all
throughout the fiscal year. 
When interviewing the directors of
local or low complexity hospitals, the GES
appear as the clearest commitment, because they
are related to performance bonuses for
government officials, even though they are not
subject to negotiation. This implies that the entire
hospital system — administrators and groups of
government officials — prioritize the follow-up
and monitoring of the fulfillment of these goals.
According to the actors, these priorities are
sometimes at odds with the main tasks required
of a hospital to provide its services.
The interviews with the directors of local
health corporations or departments show that
80% to 90% of planned activities of the local
health teams are focused on fulfillment of the GES,
central programs, public health goals and Primary
Health Care Activity Indicators (IAPS, from the
Spanish Indicadores de Actividad Primaria de
Salud), leaving little room for attending to the
specific needs of their local contexts. In small
municipalities, the adaptation is almost complete,
causing tensions in the readjustment of the local
system in order to meet the demands required to
implement the family health care model, which is,
according to every person interviewed, a national
policy weakly integrated in its goals.
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In addition, the local directors
interviewed also refer to the lack of dialogue
about what the health goals and IAPS should
measure, as well as the absence of reliable, easily
accessible information. In general, when
negotiating goals, an official rationale prevails
that prioritizes the creation of conditions to
obtain bonuses rather than a rationale aimed at
ensuring quality in local health management. The
Local Health Care Plan, designed at the primary
care level, is an unvalued instrument as it does
not contemplate the phases of development
typical of the planning process. On the other
hand, the interviewed CESFAM directors notice a
dichotomy in the process, in which "you win" if
the efforts are focused on the fulfillment of the
commitments established by the central
instruments and "you lose" if the efforts are
focused on the shifting health care actions toward
the family health care model.
One top executive of the public system
summarizes what the analysis of the managerial
instruments reveals as a critical central node:
…management of the change at the health care
network level has been insufficient. Health
services before the reform were "totipotent or
toti-functional" […] the reform took away from
them all authority in health and basically
transformed them into a holding of health care
providers, some of which are part of the health
service and some of which are not. For this
reason the management of networks is the issue
of fundamental importance.
In order to support this argument,
among other concepts he explores, this executive
upholds that:
…When examining the performance evaluations
that each health service director has committed
to achieve, and when looking at how much
these are aligned with network management, the
truth is that in these achievement commitments
network management is not noticed at all.
In conclusion, both the documentary
analysis and the results from the interviews show
a dense network of instruments and an existing
tension between the logics of external transversal
instruments, which have a stronger development
and a more general application, yet are less
sensitive to the requirements of comprehensiveness
of the PPED (except in relation to the indicators of
fulfillment of the GES), and the internal transversal
instruments that have a stronger development in
the poles Ministry/health care services
(management commitments), National Health
Fund/Undersecretariat for Health Care Networks/
health care services (health care provision services
agreements) and health care services/municipalities
(Local Health Plan or Networked Programming), a
weaker development in the relationship between
health care services/hospitals and a nonexistent
development between health care services
/Regional Ministerial Health Secretariats. In any
case, the predominance of external instruments,
particularly those from the Budget Bureau
(Dirección de Presupuestos), guided principally by
a sector-based logic, demonstrate that ministerial
goals and performance indicators are rarely
conceived as "comprehensive" and, therefore inter-
institutional, goals. Besides, the evaluations are
generally associated with the annual quantitative
budget procedure, rather than with mid- and long-
term qualitative-programmatic achievements, as is
generally the case with transformations related to
public health.
In summary, the management of the
network is limited by two factors: on the one hand,
by the weight of transversal instruments, organized
under the legal framework of the GES and the
public health goals, which align the institutions
hierarchically; on the other hand, by an
incomplete institutional adjustment of managerial
instruments specific to the health care network
needed in order to generate coordination
mechanisms throughout the continuum of services
provided.
Moreover, the people interviewed
suggest that the series of managerial instruments
impose rationales and values which are not
always in tune with the normative framework of
the human rights approach that the current
health care reform attempts to promote. It is
clear that goal negotiation (when it exists)
privileges the creation of conditions for
achieving bonuses rather than considering
public interests and reinforcing recognition of
institutional interdependencies.
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Therefore, there also seems to be little
consideration of instrumental and value
dimensions in order to develop systemic
governance, especially if we take into account that
the recent literature previously mentioned suggests
that governance is not only associated with the
contractualization of relationships of responsibility,
but also with the negotiation of commitments and
performance goals, with performance-related
incentives that align and integrate the different
actors involved, and with the bidirectional
character of information systems.
CONCLUSIONS
Systemic Governance in the health
sector has been attempted to be built basically
starting from custom transversal instruments that
seek to adapt institutional activities, from the
central level to the local one (municipalities and
local family health centers), passing through health
services and hospitals. As acknowledged by the
health service directors interviewed and other
sources (10,30), although rights have been
excluded in other fields, this process has resulted
in more equity insofar as it is certain that the
arbitrariness has been taken out of the election of
pathologies to treat, and it has generated a greater
sense of responsibility within the medical attention
provided, creating new health care access
opportunities to a group of people affected by
severe, expensive and frequent diseases. 
This achievement has been influenced
by three major elements: the recognition of
human rights guaranteed by a legal framework
(GES) that makes their enforcement mandatory;
the value-related support offered by some health
administrators; and the instrumental adherence of
health workers, related to the need for the better
salaries resulting from the bonus incentives. 
However, there remain some issues
critical to the consolidation of the PPED, both in
terms of projection and sustainability:
a) Networked management, a main component of
systemic governance, was incompletely
addressed in the reform; the institutional
character needed for its development, although
contemplated in the spirit of the law, does not
have the necessary conditions (particularly the
instruments and channels conducive to a
deliberative and integrated management) for
the performance of their functions throughout
the country. 
b) The regulatory application of the reform,
which should have addressed the spirit of the
legal framework, consolidated the fractures of
the systemic network as it failed to expand the
roles, functions and authority of the
institutions and channels which could have
played a role in developing that perspective.
c) The model of allocation of resources and
incentives directed at fulfilling public health
goals and the GES which align the institutions
tends to postpone the development of other
elements of the reform, such as a family health
focus, the role of the Health Authority in the
different regions and actions in public health.
Such elements are not properly integrated in
the process of accountability of the local
actors and cannot be duly addressed by the
Seremis, which have neither authorization nor
sufficient instruments with which to influence
the network.
d) The number of external managerial instruments
also plays a role against the systemic
governance of the sector. Many of these
instruments have rationales and values that
generate tensions difficult to ameliorate. In this
sense, the fact that the Ministries of Finance
establish the ground rules not only on budget
issues but also on global performance standards
should not be overlooked.
Within this framework, it is important to
consider that while the goals sometimes
coincide, they also create incentives for
destructive competition, that is, they do not
integrate. It is clear that the problem not only lies
in suppressing the incentives which contradict
the principles of a PPED, but also in ensuring
goals expressly aimed at developing governance.
Generally speaking, one of the most
important lessons on systemic governance that
the Chilean health care reform offers to other
PPED is likely its multifaceted character. On the
one hand, it implies successfully aligning
different actors to fulfill the obligations arising
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END NOTES
a. The health sector in Chile is divided, from an
insurance or social security point of view, into a
public and a private sector, both partially or
completely funded by employee contributions
(Bismark model) and, in the case of the public
sector, by a state contribution from the nation's
general resources (Beveridge model). These two
sectors operate according to different logics: the
former charges its services according to the risks
involved and the latter distributes these risks. The
health care reform was structured according to
the following of laws, listed in order of their
enactment: 1) Act 19888 of 2003, "on Funding,"
established increases in the Value Added Tax and
on other specific taxes in order to fund the
Regime of Explicit Health Guarantees (AUGE
plan) and other programs; 2) Act 19895 of 2003,
"ISAPRES Short Act," established financial
solvency legislation for Health Care Provider
Institutions (ISAPRES, from the Spanish
Instituciones de Salud Previsional) — ad-hoc
private health insurers — and the transfers of
affiliate portfolios among them; 3) Act 19937 of
2004, "on Health Authority," separated the
functions of public health from those concerning
the provision of services, which resulted in the
creation of the Public Health and the Health Care
Network Undersecretariats and, at the territorial
level, in the transferring of public health
functions from the health care services to the
Regional Ministerial Secretariats. Within the
health care services, defined as "managers of
networks," the Act created the figure of
Networked Self-Managed Hospitals. The Act also
extended the powers of the ISAPRES
Superintendency by granting it the supervision of
the National Health Fund (public health insurer)
and the regulation of health providers to assure
the quality of the Explicit Health Guarantee Plan;
4) Act 19966 of 2004, the "AUGE Plan,"
established a mandatory health care plan for
FONASA and ISAPRES — Health Explicit
Guarantee Plan (GES), initially named "AUGE" —
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from the recognition of a certain right, which is
only possible by legal requirement under the
category of "compelling orders." On the other
hand, it demands that actors work in an
integrated way within a value-related framework
that promotes the mutual understanding of
institutional interdependencies, a concept of the
public sphere and the respect for diversity.
From this perspective, our research
suggests that a non-critical acceptance of the
management and organization methods
inherited from the institutional reforms that
have taken place since the 80s may generate
conflicts with the need to develop governance
within the health care sector and, therefore,
may threaten the comprehensiveness particularly
required to implement a PPED. Such reforms
establish a connection between incentives and
private calculations of personal benefits which
not only fails to address the management of
interdependencies but may also result in a
weakening of the general values underlying
mutual aid and cooperation needed to achieve
comprehensive solutions.
Therefore, the institutional and
organizational challenge seems to be to combine
alignment with integration, resorting for this
purpose not only to legal requirements but also to
relationships of accountability that create ground
rules consistent with the legal framework of a
PPED and with territorial specificities. It is also
important to highlight that the partial exercise of
human rights within a context of scant resources
signals the need to discuss investments and
funding mechanisms in health.
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